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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH RASMUSSEN AND FAUN \
RASMUSSEN,

J
Plaintiffs and Appellants, F
. • )
— vs. —

|

NEAL G. DAVIS AND DORA S. DAVIS,
Defendants and Respondents.

\
f
/

No. 4218

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

DISCUSSION OF THE CASE
To understand this case one must bear in mind what
the contract is about, the terms of the contract and how the
case developed on the pleadings. A general knowledge,
based upon observation, of the operation of a Grade A
Dairy Enterprise is also most helpful.
The Davises owned and operated a farm upon which
1
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they carried on a Grade A Dairy. This farm was fully
equipped with a modern home, barns, milk sheds, farm
machinery and livestock, registered Holstein milch cows,
a flock of chickens, and a small herd of sheep. All these
properties were used together as a going concern. On the
15th day of March, 1951, after Kenneth Rasmussen, the
plaintiff and appellant, had gone over the place with Mr.
Davis, the defendant, and had made his own observations
of the land, and all the implements, equipment, and after
Mrs. Rasmussen had inspected the house twice, the parties
entered in the contract whereby the Davises agreed to sell
and the Rasmussens agreed to buy all this property, for the
agreed price of $32,000.00. Rasmussen and Davis together
consulted an attorney and had him write their contract.
The contract stipulated that the purchase price was to be
paid as follows:
$8,000.00 down, which was paid, and is now the issue
of this law suit.
$5,000.00 on or before January 1st, 1952, and the balance
in annual installments of $3,000.00 each until the last payment, that being $4,000.00, with interest on the deferred
balance at 4% per annum.
The second installment of $5,000.00, which was to be
paid J a n u a r y 1st, 1952, was represented by a promissory
Note executed by the buyers and was secured by a chattel
mortgage on some cattle then owned by the Rasmussens
(not the cattle sold under the contract).
The contract also provided that since the buyers were
let into possession, they should pay the taxes on the property,
etc.

2
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Kenneth Rasmussen seemed to have the idea that he
could leave the operation of this farm and the Grade A
Dairy project to the mercies of his wife and daughters,
while he held down a wage-earning job elsewhere, for he
spent his working time at Lark, Utah, and the women carried
on at the Dairy.
As anyone, except an extreme optimist, would expect,
Mr. Rasmussen was disappointed with the crops and with
the income from the farm and dairy. He made some complaints to Mr. Davis throughout the summer and fall, but
these related primarily to the terms for payment of the
balance of the purchase price, and some efforts were made
by him, in which Mr. Davis cooperated with him, looking
toward the Rasmussens refinancing the debt. It being understood that they intended Mr. Rasmussen was to borrow money elsewhere and pay up the obligation to Davis. All such
efforts, however, were unsuccessful.
Then, on December 31, 1952, the last day before the
$5,000.00 installment which was represented by the note and
chattel mortgage became due, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action.
Now, please notice his complaint.
First: He alleges that the provisions of the contract
relating to the rights reserved by Davis and his right to
retake possession of the property in case of default by the
buyer are void, being against publis policy.
Second: He alleges that Davis made certain false
representations regarding the character of the land to the
damage of plaintiffs in the sum of $25,000.00.

3
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So, he prays the Court:
1. To strike from the contract the provisions relating
to liquidated damages and the right to possession.
2. And, standing on the contract as they wanted it,
amended by the Court, they demand judgment against defendant for $25,000.00 damages for fraud; and
3. They want the Court to off-set their damages against
what they still owe for the property, including the $5,000.00
of the principal, and ten months interest on $24,000.00, due
January 1, 1952.
Note the result if they had been permitted to get away
with that:
They get a judgment for $25,000.00 damages for the
fraud, which wipes out all they still owe on the property
and they get title to property which is estimated by all concerned to be worth at least $30,000.00 for $8,000.00, their
initial down payment.
To the plaintiffs complaint the defendants answered,
prayed the plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and
set up the following counterclaims:
First counterclaim the defendants asked for a judgment
and decree declaring that the contract be rescinded, that
defendants have right to immediate possession, and that defendants have the right to retain as liquidated damages all
payments which had been made by plaintiffs on the purchase
price, for attorneys fees, for costs, or in the alternative, that
the Court adjudge and decree that the contract be terminated
on account of the breach, that defendants be restored the
immediate possession of the property, that the defendants

4
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have judment against the plaintiff for damages in the sum
of $10,000.00, and in case the court refused to restore possession of property to defendants, for the court to appoint a
receiver to take possession, for attorneys fees and for costs.
Second Counterclaim, that if the court shall refuse to
award the relief prayed for on the first counterclaim, then
that the defendants have judgment against the plaintiffs for
the sum of $5,000.00 for installments of principal, $1,000.00
interest, taxes, insurance, and attorneys fees; and that the
chattel mortgage be foreclosed and the personal property
therein be sold as provided by law.
Third Counterclaim for the sum of $1,805.00, together
with interest for items of personal property which was left
on the premises on plaintiffs promise to buy.
The plaintiffs answered the defendants counterclaim,
they allege the forfeiture provision is null and void, admit
they have not paid the $5,000.00 due, but allege they are
entitled to off-set it against damages for the fraud perpetrated.
They deny they have refused to pay taxes or insurance. They
deny they committed waste on the premises and admit they
sold some equipment. They accept defendants offer to rescind, and consent that defendants retain sufficient of the
$8,000.00 to pay for property not returned and the reasonable rental value. They deny other allegations in first counterclaim.
They answered the second counterclaim by admitting
they have not paid the $5,000.00, that they are entitled to
off-set it against the damages for fraud.
In the plaintiffs answer to the third counterclaim they

5
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admit some liability and deny the remainder. That they
also desire to off-set this against the fraud damages in their
original complaint.
Shortly after defendants answer was signed and filed,
the parties got together and compromised their differences;
the buyers gave up possession to the sellers, made restitution for certain items of personal property, which they
could not return, and the sellers agreed to give up the
$5,000.00 note and chattel mortgage.
Then on J u n e 26th, 1952, or 131 days after the buyers
had surrendered the property to the sellers, the plaintiffs
filed an amended supplemental complaint, in which they, in
effect, abandoned their case as set out in the original complaint, and sued upon the theory that the contract had been
rescinded by agreement of the parties, except as to the disposition of the $8,000.00 which they alleged the parties had
agreed should be divided by the attorneys or by the Court.
They only asked for $6,000.00 judgment in this amended
complaint.
In their answer the defendants agree the parties got
together and settled and compromised their case, but deny
that the settlement of the $8,000.00 was left to the attorneys
or the Court to divide. The defendants allege that the
$8,000.00 remained with the sellers in the parties compromise
agreement.
The plaintiffs in their reply denied that the agreement
was that the defendants were to keep the $8,000.00.
The case was then tried on these issues, as shown by
the amended complaint, answer and reply.

6
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APPELLANTS POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS, FAUN RASMUSSEN, ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE
EFFECT THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAINTIFF, TOLD HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE
PREMISES THAT THE ATTORNEYS WERE TO DETERMINE WHO SHOULD GET THE $8000.00 AND IF THEY
COULD NOT AGREE IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY
THE COURT. (Tr. 185)
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN
THIS CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE
IS A VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72)
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY QUESTION INVOLVED IN WHETHER THE DOWN PAYMENT
OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY B E CONSIDERED AS
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73)
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POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT
IS FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT
PLAINTIFFS TERMINATED S A I D CONTRACT OF
THEIR OWN FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00
DOWN PAYMENT PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT
SHOULD BE AND HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAIN
TIFFS TO DEFENDANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES,
WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMINATES ANY QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. (R. 73)
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PREMIUM UPON THE PROPERTY.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION.
POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND THE DEFENDANTS
SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS.
8
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POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFFS.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANTS POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS, FAUN RASMUSSEN, ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE
EFFECT THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAINTIFF, TOLD HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE
PREMISES THAT THE ATTORNEYS WERE TO DETERMINE WHO SHOULD GET THE $8000.00 AND IF THEY
COULD NOT AGREE IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY
THE COURT. (Tr. 185)
There was no error in sustaining the objection to the
proffered testimony.
If the evidence was offered to prove what agreement
had been made by the parties for the compromise of the
lawsuit, it was clearly incompetent because it was hearsay
and self serving.
But we now learn from appellants brief that it was
not offered for any such purpose. Counsel say it was offered
to rebut a claim which mght be made to the effect that
Mrs. Rasmussen was bound by what her husband and Davis
had agreed to do about the $8,000.00 unless she made
timely objection.
9
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But even for such limited purpose, the proffered evidence was immaterial and incompetent. The evidence, if it
had been admitted, could not have changed the result. It
would not have proved nor tended to prove that she was
not bound by the agreement. The fact that the statement
was made by the husband to his wife was not relevant to
any fact in issue, and hence the authority cited in the
brief is not applicable.
Furthermore, even if there were error in the Court's
ruling, the same was a harmless error and should not result
in a reversal of the judgment.
APPELLANTS POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN
THIS CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE
J U R Y AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE
IS A VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72)
We offer no argument on appellants Point Two because
they make none.
APPELLANTS POINT

THREE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY QUESTION INVOLVED IN WHETHER THE DOWN PAYMENT
O F $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY B E CONSIDERED AS
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME
10
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SHOULD B E SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT
TO THE J U R Y TO DECIDE. (R. 73)
There is no evidence in the case proving or tendng to
prove that the disposition of the $8,000.00 was to be left to
the attorneys or to the court. The evidence on this subject
shows that the whole case was settled by the agreement
of the parties.
Be it remembered that appellants in their amended and
supplemental complaint (R. 27, paragraphs 11 and 12) allege
that Kenneth Rasmussen and Neal G. Davis met and entered
into an oral agreement and that the contract was rescinded
between plaintiffs and defendants except as to the $8,000.00
which the plaintiffs paid to the defendants act the time that
contract was entered into, and that as to the $8,000.00,
Kenneth Rasmussen and Neal Davis agreed that Davis should
retain sufficient of the $8,000.00 to reimburse him for the
rental of the property during the time defendants were
in possession and any damage that might have been
done t o the premises a n d personal property during
such possession, and that Kenneth Rasmussen would get
in contact with his attorneys in an attempt to get an agreement with the defendants as to the amount of the $8,000.00
that should be retained by Davis as rental and damages.
In their answer ot the Amended and Supplemental Complaint (R. 39) the defendants admit that the contract was
rescinded by agreement of the parties, they deny the allegations concerning the $8,000.00, and in connection therewith
defendants allege that the agreement was that Davis should
keep the $8,000.00 and be returned to possession and have
11
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the hay and sheep which Rasmussen returned and that
Davis agreed to give up the $5,000.00 note and mortgage
on Rasmussens' cattle, along with interest, taxes, insurance
and attorneys fees.
And in their Reply (R 43, paragraph 2) plaintiffs admit
that the contract between them and the defendants was
rescinded but they deny that the $8,000.00 should be kept
by the defendants.
The record being so on the pleadings, the sole issue
was whether or not the agreement for compromise embodied the stipulation alleged by the plaintiffs concerning
the $8,000.00.
On this issue the burden was on the plaintiffs to
prove their allegations. They failed to carry their burden.
There is no evidence in the record to show that the agreement was as alleged by the plaintiffs or anything like it.
There was a complete failure of evidence to support their
claims. Indeed, according to the testimony of both Rasmussens, the evidence points almost conclusively the other way
and sustains defendants' allegations.
Kenneth Rasmussen testified
on the property in July, 1951:

(Tr. 18); A conversation

"I told him (Davis) that I would like to have him
take the place back and give me the cows — give me
my cows back, the mortgage on it."
Davis said: (R 19) "I am going to wait until the
first of the year and then I will either have the $5,000.00
payment or I will take the cows."
Again (Tr. 25) They talked on February 13, 1952, at
the Davis home in Ephram:
12
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"I said, (Rasmussen) I want that $8,000.00 back.
He (Davis) said you are not going to get $8,000.00
back, and he said, I f you don't — if you stop the sale
of this — if you stop this sale, I will sue you for a lot
more than this $8,000.00'."
Again on February 14, 1952, which is the day they
moved off the farm, (Tr. 42) in answer to questions by the
Court.
"The Court:
Q: You insist now that you did not make any agreement
with respect to the $8,000.00?
A: That is right.
Q: Did you say anything about it?
A: He said, 'I won't give you a penny of it.'
Q: What did you say?
A: I said, *I want part of it back.'
Q: Is that about all of that conversation . . . about all
there was to that conversation?
A: That was about all, yes."
Then they moved off.
Again, on cross examination, referring to the conversation . . . June or latter part of July, he testified: (R 99)
"I said, 'I am sick of it . . . I am so sick of it, that
I would damn near give it back to you, if you would
give me the mortgage on my cows'."
Again (Tr. 109), referring to the talk . . . the Davis
home, in February, 1952, he testified the $8,000.00 was not
mentioned. Again, (Tr. 113):
"I said how about giving me back the $8,000.00
13
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He said, 'I won's give it back to you.' He said, 'if you
don't get off there, it is going . . . if you stop this sale
on this property that I have, it will cost you a lot more'."
Again (Tr. 117, line 21 to 30 and Tr. 118, lines 1
to 22):
A: "Neal and I made this deal, my wife was not there.
Then it came down to the releasing of the mortgage.
He said that he would release this mortgage on the
cows and give me that back and then we talked
a little while and then he asked about the $8,000.00.
He said, 'I want that $8,000.00 and all this cancelled
off/ I said, 'No, sir, I want that $8,000.00, you misrepresented this to me, and the whole deal all the
way through has been misrepresented and I want the
$8,000,007'
Q: This is out in front on the 13th of February?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:

Go on, what else was said?

A:

He wanted me to come to his Attorney and fix the
matter. I said, 'I could not do a thing until I had
talked to my Attorney'.

Q: How do you know you could not do a thing about it?
A:

If you put it into law, they have a right to it. Isn't
that right?

Q:

Don't ask me.

A: Well, that is the way I understood the matter.
Q:

All right, what else did Neal say?

A: That is about the size of it, that he wanted the $8,000.00
14
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Q:

And tell us again who was present?

A;

Neal and I.

Q: Did he refuse to give you the $8,000.00?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q: And you turned over possession and everything, at
that time?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he promise to give you back any part of that
$8,000.00?
A: No, sir."
Again (Tr. 131) referring to his testmony by deposition,
we fired these questions and answers:
Q:

(by Mr. Tibbs) The third sentence on page 14, from
the top.
"Did you understand that this settlement that you and
Mr. Davis entered into in this case? A. No, sir. Q. Now,
just a minute, did you understand that is was settled? A.
No, sir, not until I talked to my attorney, I could not
settle it. Q. You don't know what happened or what
you agreed to then? A. I could not do anything until
I h a d talked with my attorney. Q. So far as you were
concerned, it had ended the case?
MR. HANSEN. I think we will object. It calls for a
conclusion of the witness and it is not a proper question. So far as you were concerned, just answer the
question? A. Yes, sir."

MR. HANSEN. We insist upon our objetion, at this time,
as calling for a conclusion of the witness.
15
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THE COURT. Well, it has been read.
MR. HANSEN. I will withdraw the objection.
THE COURT. You may proceed
"Q. It had ended the case? A. No. Q. What more
did you think was involved? A. I wanted to have a
word with my attorney. Q. Was there anything else
to be settled? A, No."
:

"

"

(by Mr. Tibbs) Were those questions made and did
you answer as I have read?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, the fifth line from the bottom, on page 14 of
your deposition.
"Q. J u s t the Attorney fee was all, is that right, yes
or no?

MR. HANSEN. Object as callng for a con-

clusion of the witness He can testify as to what was
said but not his conclusions to the legal effect of it."
MR. TIBBS. Now on page 15.

¥~
a

"Q. Please answer it? A. It was not the Attorney
fee. I had to see the Attorney, he had the case. He
had my case. I can't come to you and settle with you
or anyone, isn't that law? I am not much up on law
questions. Q. That is as you understood, that it was
finished? A. Yes7~sff7r""

"

MR. TIBBS. "and after~~~you

got with

the

^
Attorney

Q. (by Mr. Tibbs) Did you answer those answers to my
questions, as I have read?
A. Yes, sir."
16
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Again (Tr. 141), on redirect . . . (line 28) the question
was put by his own attorney:
Q: You intended him to keep the $8,000.00?
A: I could not do anything about it."
We submit there can be no error in any of the find-:
ings or in the judgment i nthis case, in the light of the
foregoing testimony of the plaintiff Kenneth Rasmussen
and of the pleadings in this case.
APPELLANTS POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT
IS FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT
PLAINTIFFS TERMINATED S A I D CONTRACT OF
THEIR OWN FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00
DOWN PAYMENT PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT
SHOULD BE AND HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAIN
TIFFS TO DEFENDANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES,
WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMINATES ANY QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. (R. 73)
We agree with Counsel for Appellants wherein they
state that even if the provisions of the contract dealing with
the matter of that forfeiure were held to be valid contrary
to appellants' contention, that would not solve the controversy between the parties to this action.
We also assert that a finding or holding by the court in
17
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favor of defendants position with respect to the so-called forfeiture provisions of the contract would not have solved the controversy between these parties as the case stood on the supplemental pleadings.
Both propositons are true because those issues were no
longer in the case.
In light of this, Perkins et al V. Spencer, et al, 243
Pac 446, does not apply to this case.
We feel constrained, however, to make the following
observations concerning the law of Perkins et al V. Spencer
et al. That case does not hold nor do any of the authorities,
so far as we know, that forfeiture clauses, or liquidated
damage clauses, are void as a matter of law. The law is
that such provisions will not be enforced by a court of
equity, if to enforce them will result in inequity and injustice to the delinquent party to a sales contract of the
kind we have here. In this case the court held that the forfeiture clause, under the facts and circumstances shown by
plaintiffs was not an injustce to the plaintiffs.
So we submit there is not error in appellants point
Four.
APPELLANTS POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO P A Y THEIR PART O F THE TAXES
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT
AND FAILED TO P A Y THE FIRE INSURANCE PREMIUM UPON THE PROPERTY.
18
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It is true the evidence does not show how much in
taxes plaintiffs had failed to pay.
But Mr. Rasmussen (Tr. 225) testified that in December
they had not paid their share of the taxes.
APPELLANTS POINTS SIX, SEVEN and EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION
SHOULD BE DISMISSED

AND

THE

DEFENDANTS

SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFFS.
What has already been written reputes, in our estimation, the propositions contained in appellants' Points six,
seven and eight.
The evidence shows that the parties got together and
compromised their lawsuit; the plaintiffs failed to prove the
issues whch they had to prove, as the pleadings stood at the
time of the trial; they failed to make a case, so there was
nothing for the court to do but to dismiss the action and
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award defendants judgment for their costs.
We therefore respectfully submit that the judgment
should be affirmed and respondents awarded their costs.
Respectfully
DON V. TIBBS
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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